Incentivos, hábitos e saliência tributária: uma leitura comportamental do desenho institucional do Programa Nota Paraná

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the institutional design of the Nota Paraná Program in light of behavioral economics, examining the correspondence between its formal configuration and the behavioral mechanisms associated with inducing tax compliance. Starting from a critique of traditional approaches based exclusively on enforcement and punishment, the research engages with literature that recognizes the limited rationality of individuals and the relevance of incentives, social norms, and salient elements in taxpayer decision-making. To achieve this objective, the research adopts a qualitative and analytical approach, using the logical model as a tool to explain the program's intervention logic, its instruments, and expected results. Based on the construction of the logical model, the institutional design of the Nota Paraná Program is analyzed in light of behavioral economics references, examining the correspondence between the program's constituent elements and the behavioral mechanisms discussed in the literature. The results indicate that the Nota Paraná Program incorporates, albeit implicitly, mechanisms compatible with the assumptions of behavioral economics, such as positive incentives and stimuli for citizen participation, contributing to the promotion of fiscal citizenship and the strengthening of state tax administration.